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CAUSES OF DELAY IN CRIMINAL CASES.'
ALBERT

2
C. BARNES.

Much has been said and written on this subject in recent years.
Nothing new can be added. The only excuse for further discussing
it is the hope that repeated insistence on needed changes may lead to
their adoption. Agitation must precede legislation, but should be
directed with organized and intelligent effort, such as may come from
Bar Associations and societies like this. To effect such changes, however, requires co-operation of the Bar and overcoming the conservation of both lawyers and legislatures. Little can be expected of the
latter that is not approved by the former. In this state we encounter a
formidable obstacle-a divided bar. The country lawyer faces no;
such conditions as suggest the necessity for swift procedure in populous
centers. He loves the game as he was taught it and sees no benefit
or profit in changing its rules. As he shapes much of our legislation,
we must break through the crust of his conservatism before we can
hope for any marked changes in our criminal practice and procedure.
Another difficulty in dealing with the subject is the prevailing
fear of destroying some safeguard to personal liberty. Vigilant attention to its preservation is enjoined by the constitution, and in our deep
concern for it we touch at the same time the strength of our substantive and weakness of our adjective law respecting crime. We
proudly differentiate ouF system that jealously guards the liberty
of the accused at every step of procedure from that whereby he may
be dragged at once before a magistrate and compelled to answer any
question and prove his innocence. Viewed from results, however,
it is probable each system might borrow features from the other with
benefit to society and no loss to the principles of human liberty. We
point with justifiable pride to those tireless sentinels, 'presumption of
innocence' and 'reasonable doubt' but admit under our breath that at
times they are grievously overworked and assume undue proportions.
On occasions they become so awe-inspiring as to obscure the jury's
vision of a whole army of facts and circumstances, and when panoplied
with the grace of oratory and paraded with impressive dignity through
reiterated written instructions, there is little wonder that they cap'Presidential address before the annual meeting of the Illinois Branch of
the Institute, Chicago, May, 1916.
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tivate the imagination of the inexperienced juror and imprison his
judgment.
While no student of jurisprudence underestimates the value of the
safeguards thrown around personal liberty, he may well consider
whether, in a worthy purpose to preserve our ideals, we do not cling to
methods that no longer subserve a valuable use and retard rather than
promote the ends of justice. And while, with a better understanding
of the causes of crime and a more scientific classification of offenses,
the treatment of the offender will undergo such modifications as humanity, .experience and science suggest, still we cannot as yet dispense
with punitive methods, and the protection of society will demand that
the door to the prison shall be more easily unlocked to get in as well
as to get out and that rubbish in the path be swept away.
Delay is a marked feature of our system of procedure. Crime
is partly condoned when justice is postponed. In the rapid succession
and publicity of current events the incident of crime is quickly forgot-.
ten. No one notes the fact more surely than the criminal. Hence
delay is his first line of defense. It is more valuable to him and
sought oftener than the constitutional guaranty of a speedy trial. He
recognizes that lapse of time softens the zeal of the prosecution, impairs its forces, and strengthens a fictitious defense; and everyone
knows that it so far palliates the offense or obliterates its recollection
that when a conviction is obtained it loses much of its deterrent influence. Whether a trial results in conviction or acquittal, it often
carries to the public a common significance-that somebody at last
has been tried for something that happened a long time ago. Too
frequently attempted vindication of the law comes too late to carry
either respect for its authority or fear of its enforcement. If these
consequences are to be averted, if penal statutes are to operate as a
deterrent of crime then the law must be so administered as to bring
offenders to swift and certain accountability.
Some desirable changes would require alteration of our state constitution, but reference will be made here to a few that can be effected
without it, in the order in which their necessity is suggested.
First. Delay incident to indictment.
Whatever reasons existed in the past for resort to an indictment,
the intervention of a grand jury is no longer required to aid prosecution or conserve personal liberty. As tribunals of justice are now organized and cases tried, every facility is afforded for the protection
of one's liberty without recourse to the presentment of a grand
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jury. It has already been abolished in some states with no complaint of public detriment or personal deprivation. The power to
institute proceedings for trial immediately after commission of the
offense while evidence is fresh and obtainable and before a fictitious
defense can be constructed, is one of the most potential factors in
the assertion of law and suppression of crime. With the power to
proceed in all cases by information the public prosecutor could bring
most cases to trial within thirty to sixty days after arrest, without infringement of a single guaranty or denial of an essential right. And
if the violator of the law knew that trial would follow close on the
heels of arrest, that prosecution would not wait the tardy process of
grand jury action, the laying on of the hand of the law would take on
a more serious aspect and carry greater terror in its expression. A
trial would often be ended before an indictment could be returned,
guilt or innocence would be speedily established, justice less often
.defeated by spurious defenses, and respect for the law enhanced by
its swift vindication. As it is, delay intervenes for no useful purpose.
The grand jury affords no assistance to the prosecutor and no protection to the accused. Its findings are more or less perfunctory and
usually as suggested by the state's attorney, and its no-bill does not
preclude a re-submission of the charge. It imposes on the-state a
useless expense, on witnesses an unnecessary loss of time and money,
on the prosecutor a duplication of labor, and on our judicial system
a needless encumbrance. As a means of securing justice it is a hindrance, and shotild no longer be retained, except, perhaps, to meet
extraordinary situations. If, however, under the peculiar wording of
our constitution the system must be entirely abolished or retained
as it is, it would better go, for the gain would greatly exceed the loss.
Second. Delay incident to pleading.
With the abolition of the grand jury would go another source of
delay-the inability to amend the criminal charge. Proceeding by information would enable the prosecutor to amend the pleading or draw
a new one in less time than it frequently takes to argue a motion to
quash an indictment, and would discourage resort to frivolous, specious, and purely technical objections that waste time without conserving any real benefit. The nice accuracy of common law indictments partly grew out of the necessity of safeguarding the liberty of
the individual in a period when it was endangered by the exercise of
tyrannical power, and its requirements have induced resort to technicalities along the whole line of procedure until our criminal practice
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has become encrusted with precedents that now present obstacles to
prosecution rather than protection to the accused. Refuge in mere
technicality would be largely abandoned under simpler forms of pleading and a procedure adapted to the practical ends for which it primarily exists. No sound reason can be advanced for adherence to an
antiquated system that has too long served to convert a process designed for ascertaining the fact of guilt or innocence into a game of
wit and subtle learning. In its maze of forms the ultimate object i
frequently lost sight of. When forms are not essential to conserve
rights and to secure a full and fair hearing, they render no service
to the cause of either liberty or justice.
The elements of most crimes are so well understood that their
statement with technical nicety is entirely unnecessary to the understanding of the charge or a preparation of defense. Anything required for either purpose beyond a simple statement charging the accused with having committed at a certain time and place a named
crime, or an offense described sufficiently for reasonable identification
and an understanding of its nature, could be supplied by order of
court, and in that way adequate information for preparation of defense
and protection against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense would be furnished. Any failure to prove its constituent elements or essential particulars could -be availed of as well under such
a system as under the most technical forms of pleading. If a statement merely said that the accused "stole A's coat from room 180,
LaSalle Hotel, Chicago, May 31, 1916," what else would he need to
know to prepare a defense unless he stole another from the same room,
or desired a description that would enable him to take advantage of a
variance? And if it simply said that he "murdered B by shooting
him" at a certain time and place, what details would be necessary to a
proper defense that could not readily be supplied by a rule of court?
Is it not time to employ in our pleadings the simple, terse, direct
language of the present day which the accused himself will understand,
and try cases with less regard for departures from form that affect
no fundamental right? As a removal from criminal pleading of the
excrescences of form and refinements that no longer serve a useful
purpose can be accomplished without violence to a single principle essential to personal liberty or loss of adequate protection against surprise or insufficient notice, and would inevitably result in expediting
trials and discouraging appeals, why should we longer postpone means
to these desirable ends?
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Third. Delay incident to the jury.
The time and methods taken to obtain a jury have brought scandal
on the system. It occasions little surprise that in some jurisdictions
the necessity of an unanimous verdict is no longer required, and that
apparent miscarriages of justice evoke the frequent comment, "What
else could you expect of a jury !"

It is too painfully evident to admit

of denial that the methods generally pursued for impanelling and
selecting jurors do not bring the most competent and qualified members of the community into service, and usually each successive process
in the selection tends to diminish the average of their intelligence. In
fact, it-requires no discernment to note the pblicy and purpose of the
accused in most instances to secure in the name of "impartial justice"
a class of jurors whose environment, association and ignorance justify
hope in an appeal to prejudice. Indulging the presumption of innocence against open methods that support the presumption of guilt
presents a judicial paradox.
A jury is an indispensable part of the court in trying a felony. A
court is organized to administer justice; justice rests on truth; and
truth requires intelligence for its solution. But when truth is converted into a plaything for ignorance and prejudice, a ball to be
bandied in a legal game, we must admit that the high sounding terms
we employ in the most sacred function of government have only relative meanings. It is plain, however, that prejudice and ignorance
should not be employed as the handmaids of justice, and that when
they are substituted for integrity and intelligence delays will ensue and
justice miscarry. But where lies the fault? First, in the false theory
that we should democratize the court by a practically indiscriminate
selection of one branch of it from the body politic; second, in the
neglect or reluctance of the presiding judge to weed out the incompetent
veniremen; third, in the latitude of examination allowed lawyers into
matters affording no proper test of the juror's qualifications; fourth, in
statutes that make the jury judges of the law as well as the fact and
require written instructions; and fifth, in legal methods calculated to
hinder rather than facilitate ascertaining the truth.
It is too much to expect of any system of selection from a large
electorate that only competent persons will be listed for jury service.
But methods can be adopted that will encourage acceptance instead of
evasion of service by men of intelligence and experience. A plan
urged before recent legislatures is that of requiring the jury commissioners to consult and accommodate those on the jury list as to the
most convenient times for service, and to place -their names- in ap-
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propriate boxes from which they may be drawn at one of those times.
There is reason for evading jury service when the citizen is compelled
to serve at inopportune times and at a large sacrifice. But consideration of his convenience coupled with assurance that his service would
not be required again except in emergencies, would elicit his patriotic
response and enlist an interest in the cause of justice that would insure not only a speedier but more intelligent disposition of cases.
The law of this state prescribes among other qualifications of
jurors that they shall be "of fair character, of approved integrity, of
sound judgment, well informed, and who understand the English
language." The duty of ascertaining the existence of these qualifications does not end with putting names on the jury list. The judge
must assume ultimate responsibility. A proper construction of these
words calls for conscientious preliminary sifting of the panel by the
presiding judge that will effect the purpose of the statute to secure
intelligence as well as integrity in the jury box. "Sound judgment"
is not possessed by those whose educational acquirements barely exceed those possible to the moron, and the "well informed" are not
found among those who confine their reading to the sporting and
advertising columns of a newspaper. One arm of the court is palsied
when prejudice and ignorance sit in the jury box. It is a travesty on
justice when either is invoked to its aid. A discriminating and not a
mere perfunctory examination by the judge, followed by a fearless
exercise of his power, would result in largely eliminating those elements that bring the jury system into disrepute and destroy confidence
in the courts. But perhaps exercise of the requisite discrimination is
too much to expect of an elective judiciary.
Such sifting, too, would remove much excuse for prolonged examination by the lawyers. The loss of time so taken is a severe reflection
on our system of administering justice. It indicates an equipment illadvised for the purpose, or excessive indulgence of the judges. It
has become a flagrant abuse, and there is something radically wrong
in a system that promotes or tolerates it. It takes longer to get the
jury in a simple conspiracy case in Illinois than to try a case of treason
in England. Our criminal courts seem to be the only machinery of
government never ready for service, and the most difficult to put into
efficient operation. But the. trial judge should assert his power to
control and limit the examination of jurors, and when it is abused force
the parties to exhaust their peremptory challenges.
But the statute itself in making jurors judges of the law gives
excuse for further delay. It furnishes a pretext for numerous in-
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him through a preliminary course of legal instruction. (A repeal of
this senseless statute, so incompatible with reason and the function of
a jury, would result in hastening the selection of the jury and shortening the time of argument. There is little doubt too that this provision
of the law is often interpreted by the jury as a license to apply the
"unwritten law" and to adopt any construction it sees fit to justify
acquittal of the guilty. It serves to destroy both time and conscience,
and is out of harmony with any rational theory of attaining justice.
It should go into the discard of legal fallacies.
But delay does not end with impanelling the jury: The devices
for protecting human liberty at the cost of public justice are not then
exhausted. Take a frequent situation. Assuming, as it should, the
burden of proof the state puts in its case fortified, we will say, by
direct and circumstantial evidence which the accused personally does
not undertake to refute though able to do so if it is not true. Silence
in most situations when one is expected to speak carries unfavorable
inferences. But here where liberty or life is at stake and the innocent
would hasten, to deny or explain incriminating evidence of matters
within his own knowledge, the law steps in to reverse mental processes.
The constitution merely requires that he shall not be compelled to
speak, but the law goes further and forbids allusion to his silence and
enjoins the mental operations it naturally produces. Whether or not
the constitutional right should be removed, as advocated by able jurists,
there is no justification of its extension beyond constitutional limits.
In an age when the accused is given every facility for defense, when he
is permitted to have counsel, testify in his own behalf, meet his accusers
face to face, when he is furnished with a written charge and necessary particulars, with the names and addresses of witnesses to be
called against him, with process to compel attendance of his own
witnesses, with a copy of the venire from which his jury will be
selected, with a right to address them, and with every protection
afforded by the most enlightened system of jurisprudence, under what
principle of natural or distributive justice -can he claim the right to dam
the logical processes of the human intellect? There is a wide gap
between compelling one to incriminate himself and alluding to his failure to avail himself of a privilege accorded by law that would naturally be resorted to if it would help him. The only effect of this provision is to put a clamp on legitimate argument and render conviction
of the guilty more difficult.
A kindred anomaly under circumstances of defendant's silence is
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the calling of numerous witnesses to his good reputation when it has
not been impeached or questioned and is supported by legal presumption. Taking time to hear from twenty-five to fifty and more character witnesses in such circumstances, as is done in our courts, is wholly
indefensible. The failure to restrict the practice has led to calling
mere casual acquaintances-even the judge's associates on the Bench
-to establish good reputation. The psychological effect contemplated
by the number and social or political prominence of witnesses is wholly
apart from the legitimate purpose for which such evidence is admissible, and when received without limitation it adds to delay a perversion of privilege and abuse of judicial discretion.
A reasonable limitation should likewise be put on argument. The
cases are few that cannot be*adequately argued within one to three
hours. Of course it is too much'to expect that any restriction will
eliminate resort to sophistry and maudlin sentiment, or patent distortion of evidence. The judge often sits with humiliation, and loss of
pride in our boasted system, when compelled to listen to arguments
directed to the jury that no respectable lawyer would venture to address to him, and required to remain silent as he sees truth smothered
with sophistry and justice chained to iguorance and prejudice. But
when hours and even days are taken to analyze and summarize testimony that in essential parts would cover but a few pages of legal cap,
it suggests either a very patient court, or a very obtuse jury, or a very
incompetent or cunning lawyer,--in any event a defective tribunal.
And when part of that time is taken So discuss and read law to the
jury the situation approaches a climax little less than ridiculous.
But, as a last step to bewilder the jury, they are given written
instructions, couched in redundant language and in the most exact and
technical phraseology. They are seldom understood and rarely consulted except to justify the obduracy of some recalcitrant juror or
to bring him to the views of the majority. Usually only the parts
favorable to these particular purposes are regarded. The common
law right of the judge to charge the jury and elucidate the points of
the case whereby it is aided in reaching an intelligent conclusion should,
be restored. Judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago are given the
right to instruct orally and comparatively few reversals result from
failure to instruct properly. But better still is the court's illuminating
analysis of the questions at issue which enables the jury to clear away
the underbrush and get a perspective of the case not afforded by written instructions. Restoration of our former practice would unques-
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tionably result in better verdicts, fewer disagreements and less reversals.
A cause of delay and disagreements in murder and some other
cases is the requirement that the jury fix the penalty. Cases made
important by their serious nature or the social station of the accused
usually result in an unsatisfactory compromise. The views of the
several jurors vary with their characters, training and experiences.
They are not accustomed to the application of standards and differentiation of facts essential to that function. If the power of fixing
definite punishment, unless it be death, should be a province of the
court, it should be vested in the judge, who from varied experience,
wide observation and study, and the opportunity to investigate the
history and mental characteristics of the convicted, is best fitted to
determine it. Many times a jury would speedily reach a verdict of
guilt if the responsibility of its consequences did not rest on their
shoulders.
It is a recognized fact that from fear and inexperience the first
verdicts of a jury, whatever the evidence, are generally for acquittal,
but that as they gather experience they convict on even flimsy evidence,
thus illustrating that fluctuating standards and unstable opinions accompany that course of justice that calls the uneducated and inexperienced to its administration. It is a common observation that
the service of jurors usually ends just as they begin to get educated to
their work-just as they become familiar with the ways of the criminal
and the arts of his lawyer, and able to distinguish perjury from truth.
The jury system, however, wilt remain long beyond our day, despite
its inherent defects. But those grafted on it by indefensible practices
and statutes can be removed, and until they are we should no longer
hug the delusion that the verdict of a jury is the epitome of human
wisdom.
But all delay cannot be charged to juries, judges and methods.
Much must be laid to the so-called criminal lawyer. The term in
large cities has become ambiguous and almost a reproach. Too frequently he does not practice law but lends his services to defeat it.
To that end perjury is unblushingly employed. Though masked, it
stalks boldly through the temple of justice under his ministration. It
seldom passes the detection of the experienced judge but frequently
deludes a weak and undiscerning jury. The ethics and ideals of"the
legal profession abhor such a prostitution of the calling, but like others
it cannot wholly eliminate the unworthy. Proof for conviction or
even disbarment is seldom obtainable. The other members of the
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conspiracy rarely "squeal". Effective remedies beyond tireless vigilance and fearless exposure by bar associations are not easily suggested.
But persistent exposure of those whose names become associated with
"crooked" methods will tend to make perjury unprofitable and its
employment dangerous.
Fourth. Delays after conviction.
But when conviction is reached final judgment and punishment
should not be unduly delayed. Continuance of motions that defer
entry of judgment is too freely indulged. Every step of criminal
procedure should suggest expedition without hurry and consideration
without dallying. There should be but one review, and that should
not wait the slow arrival of court terms. It should be had just as
soon after conviction and a reasonable time for preparation, as the
case can be heard.
The swift methods employed in other countries have bred a national respect for law notably lacking in America. Doubtless laxity
in the enforcement of law has contributed much to that unfortunate
defect in our character. But back of that are our inadequate methods
of attaining results.* We need to revamp our judicial machinery. To
that end three things are indispensable-an independent judiciary, intelligent juries, and swifter procedure. As to the last, there is a wide
range for action between the attitude of worshipping forms and the
iconoclastic spirit that would destroy system. Standards confirmed
by wisdom and experience should remain unshaken, but precedents,
forms and theories that have lost all practical value are barnacles
on the keel of justice and should no longer be permitted to impede it.
As to securing an independent judiciary much can be said. But as
the chief fault lies in the state constitution, I shall not discuss it.
Possibly there are those who think these criticisms of our jury
system are overdrawn. But they are the result of 20 years' experience
and observation as prosecutor and judge in the second largest criminal
court of this country. Under the forms and methods annexed to our jury
system it lodges more causes of delay and miscarriages of justice than
any other branch of our judicial system. Recently a patient Chicago
judge remarked that there were seventeen successive verdicts of not
guilty in his court. In little over six years, fifteen women have been
tried- in Cook County for murder, nine for killing their husbands,
without a single conviction. After a dozen fruitless efforts by one
state's attorney with different juries to secure a conviction for violating the Sunday laws where the facts were not disputed such prosecutions were abandoned. But why cite instances when they crowd the
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court dockets and have become so familiar that they no longer excite
surprise? That such results are due to the defects of our jury system
no one can question. But unless we are wakened from indifference to
the consequences, there will surely follow a looser regard for law, less
respect for the courts and a weakened sense of civic responsibility.
There are other causes of delay in attaining final results in criminal cases, but those referred to are patent and the necessity for their
removal is less a question of theory than a call for action. While the
efforts of this society to correct evils in dealing with crime will often
carry it into fields where theory is alluring and experiment interesting, it can accomplish much in urging the adoption of methods that
will expedite justice and promote respect for law-two pressing needs
in the State of Illinois.

